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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
TAXATION-CAPITAL GAINS-IMMATURE FRUIT AS REAL
PROPERTY. Plaintiff, a Florida farmer, was engaged in growing
and selling mature or ripe citrus fruit; she had owned the citrus
grove for over six months. In 1945, the plaintiff sold the grove, with
a crop of immature, unsevered fruit, for a lump sum consideration.
She reported the sale on her income tax return as a gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months.
Upon reviewing the plaintiff's tax return, the Commissioner allocated
$6000.00 of the gain realized to the citrus fruit on the trees, taxable
as ordinary income. Plaintiff paid the deficiency, then filed for a
refund. Her claim was rejected by the Commissioner. Plaintiff instituted this suit and the court held that the entire gain from the sale
was a capital gain, not ordinary income, and was to be taxed accordingly, therefor allowed her a refund. Irrgang v. Fahs, 94 F.Supp.
206 (S.D. Fla. 1950).
A recent California case,' although possessing a similar factual
situation, declared the profits attributable to the citrus fruit was to
be taxed as ordinary income.
It has often been stated that federal revenue laws are designed
to facilitate a national scheme of taxation; their provisions are not
to be deemed subject to state laws unless the language or necessary
implication of the section involved so requires. It is also well settled that state law determines legal rights and interests and where
they have become vested the federal revenue laws designate which
interests and rights should be taxed.'
Both Florida and California jurisdictions recognize that crops of
fruit growing on trees, whether immature or mature, are parts of
the realty and, unless reserved, go with the realty in its transfer.'
The court in the Watson case,' stated that whether the immature
fruit is treated as realty or personalty is of little consequence. The
fact remains the fruit was held primarily for sale and should be
taxed as ordinary income, as stipulated in a Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling of 1946.' The Florida court adopted a more liberal view
in favor of the taxpayer. which, the court believed was the intent of
Congress.'
The mere fact that property is realty does not allow it to be
taxed as a capital gain, nor does the manner of sale or method of
liquidation determine whether the seller is within the provisions of
Earnest A. Watson, 15 T.C. No. 104 (1950).
- Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); cf., Morgan v. Commissioner,
309 U.S. 78 (1939).
Morgan v. Commissioner, supra note 2.
4
E.g., Adams v. Adams, 28 So.2d 254 (1946); Simmons v. Williford, 53
So. 452 (1910); Earnest A. Watson, supra note 1. (Tax Court states
there is no hard and fast rule under California law, but concedes the
question in favor of realty as pertaining to this case).
Earnest A. Watson, supra note 1.
I.T. 3815, 1946.2 Cum. Bull. 30. (Ruled the seller of a citrus grove with
fruit on the trees must allocate a portion of the selling price to the fruit
and the balance to the land. The portion of the price representing the
gain from the fruit will be taxed as ordinary income.)
H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1942); Sen. Rep. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1942); For a discussion favoring the view of
the Irrgang case, see Hill, Ordinary Income or Capital Gain on the Sale
of an Orange Grove, 4 Miami L.Q. 145 (1950).

RECENT CASES
Section 117 (j)s allowing the property to be taxed as a capital gain!
The Internal Revenue Code clearly shows that it is either the purpose
for which the property is acquired or held or its use that determines
0
whether it will be taxed as a capital gain."
The question usually
asserted is: "Was the property sold, held by the taxpayer, primarily
for salt to customers in the ordinary course of his business?" If this
question is answered in the affirmative then it does not qualify to
be taxed as a capital gain. The facts considered necessary to create
the status of one engaged in a trade or business within the capital
gains provisions revolve largely around the frequency or the continuity of the transaction, which it is claimed, results in a business
status.'
Some courts have stated that in the absence of the elements
of development and sales activity and the impracticability of disposing of the property in one tract, then the frequency and continuity
is in and of itself a narrow definition of a business transaction.'The aforementioned test of frequency and continuity when used
to determine the ordinary course of business has been applied in the
four following instances.
(1) The sale, by a coal mining company,
of land possessing "coal in place" was held not to be in the ordinary
course of business and was deductible as a capital loss rather than
as an ordinary loss because the company was in business to sell mined
coal to regular cutomers." (2), The profits resulting from the sale of
growing timber by a firm engaged in manufacturing and selling
finished lumber also were taxable as a capital gain." (3) Where
lumber was sold, for the purpose of liquidating a partnership formerly
engaged in the management of family properties and investments, the
profits realized were held taxable as "capital gains."' (4) A farmer,
engaged in producing and marketing dairy products, who sold his
non-profit milking cows, was allowed to treat the profits realized
as "capital gains".'%'
The Irrgang case follows the test of frequency and continuity as
the determinant by stating that the taxpayer was in the business of
selling ripe oranges, not real estate possessing citrus trees with immature fruit; thus extending the view of Butler Consolidated Coal
7
Co. v. Commissioner"
to apply to the citrus industry. The Watson
case' justified its contra holding by stating: "We are unable to see
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26 U.S.C.A. §117 (j). In order to tax the profit as a capital gain, the
taxpayer must show that the property: (1) was used in his trade or
business, (2) was realty or property of a kind subject to an allowance for
depreciation, (3) was held for more than six months, (4) not of a kind
includible in the inventory of taxpayer at the close of the taxable year,
(5) of a kind not held by the taxpayer for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
Ehrman v. Commisisoner, 120 F.2d 607 (1941).
See note 8 supra.
Commissioner v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305 (1939); accord, Welsh v. Solo,
man, 99 F.2d 41 (1938); Ehrman v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
See Frieda E. J. Farley, 7 T.C. 198, 202, 203, (1946) (sale of residential
lots, out of a large tract of land, used by the taxpayer for growing flowers); accord, United States v. Robinson, 129 F.2d 297 (1942).
Butler Consolidated Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 183 (1946).
Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 467 (1944); accord.
Carroll v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 806 (1934).
United States v. Robinson, supra note 12.
Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (1949).
Butler Consolidated Coal Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 13.
Earnest A. Watson, supra note 1.
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how the holding of the oranges primarily for
changed to a holding primarily for some other
grower manages to realize his purpose to sell
his liking before the oranges mature, or because
transaction the land was also sold."

sale to customers is
purpose because the
by making a sale to
as a part of the same

The problems raised in these cases are not confined solely to the
citrus industry, but are of utmost importance to every farmer." Not
until the unique problems of the farmer are taken into consideration
will uniformity be obtained, and a satisfactory solution to the capital
gains provisions be a reality.
William E. Porter
TORTS-PARENT AND CHILD-PARENTS' IMMUNITY FROM
LIABILITY TO CHILD FOR TORT COMMITTED BY PARENT.
Plaintiff, an illegitimate child, sued her father's estate to recover for
shock, mental anguish and permanent nervous and physical injuries
resulting from her father's murdering the plaintiff's mother, imprisoning the plaintiff with the corpse, and subsequently committing
suicide in her presence. Defendant demurred, relying on the generally recognized exception to tort liability that a parent is immune
from liability to an unemancipated minor child.' It was held that this
was not an action by the child against the parent for simple negligence, and since the family relations have been previously undermined, the reason for the parent's immunity does not exist. The
child may therefore recover against the estate for malicious and
wanton wrongs. Mahukee v. Moore. 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951).
Lacking English precedent, the American rule exempting a
In
parent from tort liability to its minor child dates back to 1891.'
the vast majority of cases the immunity privilege will promote discipline and domestic harmony and encourage the most beneficial
development of children. However, the reason for the exception no
longer exists when the tort destroys the close family relationship
intended to be protected. Nevertheless, the rule has generally been
followed unwaveringly although the reason for it had entirely failed.
The few decisions which refuse to follow the rule do so on the
grounds that: (1) allowing suit by the child will, in certain cases,
promote and secure family ties rather than jeopardize them,' (2)
controlling statutes forming public policy overrule any contrary
5
policy or (3) the close family ties meant to be protected have
(income
Thomas J. McCoy, P-H T.C. 15.106, 15 T.C. 106 (1950).
realized by a Kansas wheat farmer on the sale of a farm upon which there
was a growing crop of wheat, was held to be ordinary income, and not
capital gains, to the extent that it represented payment for the growing
crop.).
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Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Ciani v.
Ciani, 127 Misc. Rep. 304, 215 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1926); Smith v. Smith
81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Lasecki v. Kabara,
235, Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923).
Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939); Marchand v. Marchand, 4 D.L.R. 157 (Canada 1924).

